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NOTES AND COMMENTS

determine that substantial employee interests require a limited revival of
the "equal time" d6ctrine.' 8
Bill York

DOMESTIC RELATIONS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF OKLAHOMA'S MISCEGENATION STATUTES
Oklahoma's Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of
Oklahoma's miscegenation statutes I in Jones v. Lorenzen.2 The petitioners
sought a writ of mandamus to require the clerk of Canadian County,
Oklahoma, to issue a marriage license. One applicant was Mexican, the
other a Negro, placing them within the purview of the statute forbidding
such marriages. Assuming original jurisdiction,3 the supreme court dedared the issue to be whether they should overrule Blake v. Sessions4 and
hold the miscegenation statutes unconstitutional as being in violation of
the first and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution.
Historically, miscegenation statutes have been attacked under the "equal
protection of the laws" clause of the fourteenth amendment. Such attacks
date from the 1882 case of Pace v. Alabama 5 where the United States
Supreme Court held that an Alabama Statute, which prohibited a white
person and a Negro from living together in adultery or fornication, was
not in conflict with the Constitution, although it prescribed more severe
penalties than those to which the parties would be subject, were they of
the same color and race. This decision advanced the theory that since
there was equal punishment there was no discrimination. Oklahoma cases
on the subject not only have upheld the constitutionality of the statute6
but also have described the intended purpose of the statute as applying ". . . to all persons, citizens, residents, and transients in the state, and
are intended to prohibit marriage of the decendants of the African race
1

8 Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).

1OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 12 (1961): "The marriage of any person of African descent, as defined by the Constitution of this State, to any person not of
African descent, or the marriage of any person not of African descent to any person of African Descent, shall be unlawful and is hereby prohibited within this
State." OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 13: "Any person who shall marry in violation of
the preceding section, shall be deemed guilty of felony, and upon conviction thereof
shall be fined in any sum not exceding five hundred dollars, and imprisonment in
the penitentiary not less than one nor more than five years."
2
36 OKLA. B.A. J. 2237 (1965).
3 OKLA. CONST. art. VII 5 72.
4 94 Okla. 59, 220 Pac. 876 (1923).
G106 U.S. 583 (1882).
6 Blake v. Sessions, supra note 4.
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with any other race in this state' "7 Only California has declared this type
statute in violation of the "equal protection" clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Speaking for the court, in Perez v. Lippold,8 Mr. Justice
Traynor pointed out that marriage is one of the rights protected by the
fourteenth amendment, as declared by the United States Supreme Court
in Meyer v. Nebraska9 and that, "In the absence of an emergency the
state clearly cannot base a law impairing fundamental rights of indivduals
on general assumptions as to traits of racial groups:'10
The Jones decision relied heavily on past decisions, particularly the
leading federal case of Stevens v. United States." In the Stevens case the
Oklahoma miscegenation statute was held not to be in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. Pace 2 and its equal punishment theory were the
primary basis for the decision. Since the United States Supreme Court had
not decided the question confronting the Oklahoma court, the principle
that decisions of lower federal courts on federal questions, though not
controlling, are highly persuasive 13 was applied, and the court echoed the
results of the Stevens case. Thus, in the Jones case, the miscegenation statutes were once again declared to be constitutional.
Little, if any, consideration was given to McLaughlin v. Florida,'4 which
held that a Florida Statute,15 which prohibited the cohabitation of a Negro
and a white person of different sexes, to be unconstitutional. Speaking
through Mr. Justice White, the court said:
Because the section applies only to a white person and a Negro
who commit the specified acts and because no couple other
than one made up of a white and a Negro is subject to conviction upon proof of the elements comprising the offense it
proscribes, we hold § 798.54 invalid as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.' 6
While this decision dealt with interracial cohabitation as opposed to
interracial marriage, it did set out a test which the court might apply to
statutes differentiating between racial groups and dealing with fundamental rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The Court said,
Our inquiry, therefore, is whether there clearly appears in the
relevant materials some overriding statutory purpose requiring
the proscription of the specified conduct when engaged in by
a white person and a Negro, but not otherwise. Without such
7

Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 483, 484 (1925).

832 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1947).

9262 U.S. 390 (1923).

10 Perez v. Lippold, supra note 8, at _, 198 P.2d at 20.

11146 P.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944).
12 Pace v. Alabama, supra note 5.
13
Bruce v. Evertson, 180 Okla. 111, 68 P.2d 95 (1937).
34 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
156 FLA. STAT. § 798.05.

3 Mclaughlin v. Florida, supra note 14, at 184.
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justification the racial classification . . .is reduced to an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause. 7
It was also pointed out in McLaughlin that the interpretation of the equal
protection clause handed down in Pace had been swept away by subsequent decisions of the Court. With the overruling of the effect of Pace,
the basis of the Stevens case and ultimately the basis for upholding the
miscegenation statutes like that in Oklahoma was greatly diminished.
Where are state courts to turn? The Oklahoma court was faced with
abundant precedent upholding the constitutionality of these statutes and
at the same time faced with a liberal trend on a national level, which can
only be resolved by the United States Supreme Court which has been
reluctant to decide this issue. The Court had an opportunity to decide the
question in Naim v. Naim,'8 but refused certiorari on a procedural point.
Likewise, as indicated above, they had an opportunity to go more directly
to the issue at hand in McLaughlin, but chose not to.
The next move is up to the Supreme Court, because of the reluctance
of the state courts to lead in changing and the vast amount of case law
supporting constitutionality. Until the highest Court either upholds or
voids these laws, they will continue in force on this uncertain footing.
In forecasting the outcome of this situation, Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in McLaughlin should be noted, for he indicated that
"...it is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of
the actor. Discrimination of that kind is invidious per se." 19
Problems of racial discrimination are of growing concern in our country. The civil rights of all citizens of the United States must be protected
in an equal manner. As long as laws exist which make it a crime to marry
another because one is a member of the African race and the other is of
another race, or which prohibit marriage for the same reason, it cannot
be said that equal protection exists.
John Turner
PATENTS: ACTION BY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
FOR INFRINGEMENT OF GOVERNMENT PATENT
The United States Court of Claims held in the recent case of Tektronix
Inc. v.United States' that the general policy of free-use of government
patents over the past 100 years gives an unlicensed user an implied license
17 Id. at 192-93.
Is350 U.S. 985 (1956).
19 McLaughlin v. Florida, supra note 14, at 198.
'351 F.2d 630 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
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